Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of singularity by Listik, Yonathan
Griot : Revista de Filosofia, Amargosa  - BA, v.19, n.1, p.76-95, fevereiro, 2019 ISSN 2178-1036 
  https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v19i1.1153 
Artigo recebido em 14/10/2018 
Aprovado em 25/11/2018 
 
LISTIK, Yonathan. Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of singularity. Griot : Revista de Filosofia, Amargosa – BA, v.19, 
n.1, p.76-95, fevereiro, 2019.   76 
 Artigo publicado em acesso aberto sob a licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
 
JEAN-LUC NANCY’S NOTION OF SINGULARITY 
 
Yonathan Listik1 
Essex University 
  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4684-9611 
Email : yl18758@essex.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT:  
My article aims to explore Nancy's notion of sense as a key ontological concept because I 
believe this concept  as it appears mainly in his "Sense of the World", opens the possibility of 
a more profound understanding of his thesis. This will not be an attempt to draw a map or a 
line in Nancy's theory placing sense either as the starting point or as his central concept. 
Instead, it is an attempt to show that sense plays a significant role in Nancy's understanding 
of singularity and finitude and therefore provide an insight into Nancy’s overall theory of 
being. My argument analyses sense's centrality to Nancy´s discussion on touch and the vital 
role touch has in the articulation between his comprehension of mitsein/etre-avec and his 
elaboration of being as singular plural. 
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“Qu’est-ce qu’une singularité? C’est ce qui n’a lieu qu’une fois, en un seul 
point – hors temps, hors lieu, en somme – ce qui est une exception. Non 
pas une particularité qui rentre sous un genre, mais une propriété unique 
qui échappe à l’appropriation, une touche exclusive et qui, comme telle, 
n’est même pas prélevée sur un fond commun et ne s’oppose pas non plus à 
lui.”2  (Nancy, “Rives, bords, limite) 
 
Single existence 
 
The central concern of this article is Nancy’s characterization of singularity, 
but before entering this topic we should ask: why pose the question of singularity? It 
may seem that singularity is superfluous. It involves commenting on the singular 
case of existence once a larger notion such as world could provide a better 
ontological standing point. Yet, this is a misleading conclusion. Nancy’s logic of 
existence is not established without a proper examination of the singular-plural 
mode of existence. Considering that Nancy’s philosophy is centered on the 
groundless occurrence/event, there is no common ground to all existing things so the 
configuration of each singular/specific case and its relation to the general truth is 
crucial to his enterprise.   
 
Being-with 
 
In my view, the best place to enter Nancy’s analysis of existence is the 
question of being-with. This is not the essential principle behind the togetherness of 
things, but it establishes the central fact concerning existence: there is no existence 
in isolation. The analysis of singularity is invariably the analysis of the way things 
exist together rather than the analysis of the individual unrelated object. Further on 
this line on reasoning, since a thing is always being-with, by commenting on 
existence one is touching it. The analysis of the existing thing always “interferes” 
with it and is not an observation from a distance3. It is reaching as closes as possible 
without gaining access to it, since there is no inner “nature” to be discovered. 
According to Nancy, the existing things are always in constant “contact” with each 
other and with themselves. Hence, besides “being-with”, the central concept here 
will be “touching”.    
Nancy explains that being-with is the invariable condition of existing because 
being is being-sense. “Sensing” (as acting in direction) is at the same time “sensing” 
(touching) other “senses” (beings), so presence is never individual but only “singular-
plural”. Things can only be-with4, because every-single-thing exists and they all 
                                                          
2 “What is a singularity? It is that who does not take place beyond once, in a single point – outside time, outside 
space, in conclusion – that which is an exception. Not a particularity that enters a genre, but a unique property 
that escapes appropriation, an exclusive touch and, as such, is not even sampled/collected in a common ground 
and does not oppose itself to it” (my translation). 
3 Nancy argues that by weighing on existence (thinking existence) ontology also weighs (is part of the 
togetherness of all things). That is, ontology (the thoughts of the world) is also part of the totality of all things 
(i.e., the world) since thoughts are things. 
4 Nancy refers to Heidegger’s mitsein but I will not further elaborate on that. 
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exist together. The “with” is an inherent part of being because the world is the 
togetherness of all things, therefore there is no neutral place where being happens 
(“Of Being-in-Common” 1-2). There is no “background field” where all things are 
and “with” points to the interaction between them. The existing thing does not exist 
purely, in a neutral and unaffected “place”; rather, beings exist as the world (the 
finite configuration of every-single-thing together5 and not the place where things 
happen). 
Nancy uses the concept of comparution [compearance6] to describe this aspect 
of being. The concept refers to the fact that all things, every single one of them, co-
appears (compearing, in some translations). Put differently, they take place 
together. But not because they appear together under one essential motion; there is 
no force that assembles them into simultaneously existing. Instead, Nancy affirms 
that the mode of existing (performing the act of being) is to be-with. Or returning to 
the language of sense: the sensing of sense (acting of being) is invariably sensing 
(touching) sense (being[s]). He even uses the term “co-essence” and “co-ipséité” to 
describe this condition:  
 
What is shared is nothing like a unique substance in which each 
being would participate; what is shared is also what shares, what is 
structurally constituted by sharing, and what we call “matter”. 
The ontology of being-with can only be “materialist”, in the sense 
that “matter” does not designate a substance or a subject (or an 
antisubject), but literally designates what is divided of itself, what 
is only as distinct from itself, partes extra partes, [...]. The ontology 
of being-with is an ontology of bodies, of everybody, whether they 
be inanimate, animate, sentient, speaking, thinking, having weight, 
and so on. (Being Singular Plural 83-84)7 
 
By definition, all existing things must exist somewhere, since existence is 
analogous to taking place. It is impossible to conceive of something that does not 
exist within a context so, in that sense, it is constantly touching something. As 
mentioned before, existence is always “more than one”, so there is invariably a 
contact within plurality. Considering the previous argument regarding totality, a 
possible counterargument becomes impossible. It would require arguing that one can 
find an absolute object that does not touch anything because it is everything (so 
there would be nothing besides it, i.e., nothing exterior for it to touch). But such an 
object would not exist, because it would literally be nowhere. In that sense, 
being/existing is touching: it is being present in the togetherness of every existing 
thing. In this way, being-with evidences the extensive “nature” of materiality.   
Being-with also marks materiality as weight, since existing happens among 
other existing things. The weight of being marks the invariable “pressure” of being-
                                                          
5 See The Sense of the World 6-8, 155 and The Creation of the World, Or, Globalization 41-42.  
6 But not in the legal connotation exclusively. 
7 See the quote from The Sense of the World 70. Nancy argues in the same paragraph that both Peter and a rock 
(in French: Pierre and pierre) answer the question of existence by being.  
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with. Weight is not a quality of the thing, but something the object is. It is the mark 
of the objects materiality as its presence, i.e., as the fact that it invariably exists 
among other things and therefore its occurrence exerts “pressure” in touching.  
Considering that the thing is its weight and this weight, so Nancy is clearly 
arguing, is an invariable “contact” due to the thing’s mere occurrence, Existing 
means being-with. Or to put it through negation, there is no object in a vacuum of 
zero gravity. There is no materiality in isolation because both extension and weight 
demand touching:  
 
Here (but where’s here? It’s not localizable, it’s localization taking 
place, the being’s that’s coming to bodies), so here it’s not a question 
of rejoining an intact “matter”: immanence isn’t being opposed to 
transcendence. In a general way, we don’t oppose, bodies neither 
oppose nor are opposed. They are posed, deposed, weighted. There’s 
no intact matter-or else there’d be nothing. On contrary, there’s 
tact, the pose and deposing, the rhythm of coming-and-going of the 
bodies in the world. Tact united, divided unto itself. (Corpus 117) 
 
Harman (in Gratton and Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking) accuses 
Nancy of defending an amorphous state of matter where things become themselves 
only within a relation. According to him, Nancy must assume some sort of prima 
materia before any touching. He argues that, for Nancy, things are either in a 
relation or they are an indeterminate form/matter. But this is just Harman’s 
assumption: “This untouchable touchable deserves the name of ‘object’. What I 
mean by an object is a concrete reality that has specific determination or from quite 
apart from its relations with anything else. And quite apart from its purely 
accidental way of being on the stage at any moment” (87). The response from within 
Nancy’s theory would be simple: Harman demands a non-existing object, i.e., an 
object that is not taking place. This intact object Harman demands does not exist 
because it is not occurring. Harman demands an ontology that separates between 
the essence of the object and its occurrence. In this way, he creates the demand for a 
prima materia and forces it on Nancy’s philosophy. Nancy clearly states that the two 
options Harman gives him are unreal; there is only one of them: being-with. 
Harman defends his point by arguing that Nancy is interested in more than 
the “here-and-now”. This seems to be a misinterpretation of Nancy, because even 
though the “here-and-now” is insufficient for Nancy, there is nothing “more”. There 
is no surplus intact aspect of things that remains secret. Nancy would argue that the 
“here-and-now” is not sufficient to ground the object precisely because there is no 
grounding. The “here-and-now” is all there is, at the same time that it is always 
“without”8 (rather than the excess Harman mentioned in Gratton and Morin, Jean-
Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking 88). This is the reason things are not predetermined 
and therefore are a surprise9. Contrary to Harman’s affirmation, Nancy is 
exclusively interested in the “here-and-now” because there is no intact (untouched) 
                                                          
8 As I elaborated in the previous section. 
9 This was extensively analyzed previously.  
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aspect of being to reveal. That is, there is no untouched “nature” to be discovered 
beyond the being-with. The “whatness” of thing is its presence among all things.    
It becomes evident that “touch” plays a crucial role in Nancy’s ontology of 
being-with. In his book On touching, Jean Luc Nancy, Derrida mentions the 
following phrase by Bergson to describe Nancy’s philosophy: “A philosopher worthy 
of the name has never said more than a single thing: and even then, it is something 
he has tried to say, rather than actually said” (368). For Derrida, this single thing is 
“touch”.  
Derrida mentions the fact that, in Nancy, touching is not exclusive to humans. 
As it is clearly stated in the chapter “touching” of The Sense of the World, even a 
stone touches. If even the most “passive” things touch, it must concern an extremely 
elementary and common quality. Touching does not imply agency or intention.  
Nancy argues that touching in fact concerns the most basic and common aspect of 
all things: existing. Touching is existing, because existing is being-with. In that 
sense, touch occupies a central place in Nancy’s ontology, but it is worth showing 
that it cannot serve as the core around which his whole theory orbits, as Derrida 
seems to imply. Touch is only a sense among the plural senses on sense, which also 
include the orientation and meaning of being as I previously elaborated.  
Before any further development on this issue, it is crucial to mention that 
Nancy is not arguing that touch is the essential sense of being. Existence is not 
reduced to touching. Nevertheless, it is a central part of Nancy’s ontology so the 
question of its status deserves a careful inspection. If touch is not literally the act of 
touching (or at least not just the intuitive understanding of it), then what is it? It 
seems that, for Nancy, touching is simply being in contact (or at least this seems to 
be the only definition that engulfs both the stone and the human). It seems that the 
simple fact that two things are in contact already configures touching. Derrida does 
not provide a definite answer, but he does point at the aporetic nature of the 
question: one can never really touch anything; at the same time, there is no absolute 
isolation. Moreover, is touching something we do, or is it something that happens to 
us? Can one really touch without being touched? It seems like touch enjoys a 
distinct status from other senses. It is simultaneously the most banal of the senses, 
i.e., simple contact, and impossible to grasp.  
According to Derrida, Nancy argues that one touches only the untouchable: 
one can only touch the limit of touching and never actually come in contact. No 
matter how close two objects are, it is always possible to distinguish them, or else 
they would be the same. The sole fact that one comments on the existence of two 
things already presupposes their distinction. If two things cannot occupy the same 
space, then it is quite trivial that there must be something between them that 
separates them thus making contact impossible.  
On the other hand, things never stop touching. There is no-thing in isolation: 
there is no intact object segregated from all other things. Derrida mention of 
Husserl’s distinction between seeing and touching illustrates this point. One never 
sees oneself seeing. One can look in the mirror and see one’s own eye, but the eye 
does not see itself seeing. There is a blind spot conditioning vision. Touching, on the 
other hand, must sense itself sensing. One is constantly touching and being touched; 
Griot : Revista de Filosofia, Amargosa  - BA, v.19, n.1, p.76-95, fevereiro, 2019 ISSN 2178-1036 
 
LISTIK, Yonathan. Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of singularity. Griot : Revista de Filosofia, Amargosa – BA, v.19, 
n.1, p.76-95, fevereiro, 2019.   81 
 
it is a non-mediated sensing. Touching is immediate. It is always already taking 
place. It is possible to see without being seen, but it is impossible to touch without 
being touched.   
According to Derrida this is the law of tact: “in the sense of knowing how to 
touch without touching, without touching too much, where touching is already too 
much” (On Touching, Jean Luc Nancy 67). We are always already touching and 
every touch is always too much since touching is impossible. The “without” marked 
here by Derrida plays the same role as Schuback’s “without”. It is at the same time 
a touch without completion, i.e., without full contact, and all there is to touching. 
Moreover, touching as the condition of being implied in being-with means that 
occurrence is simultaneously singularly distinguished from the world and completely 
in touch with the world. Being is in-common, so it is singular only inasmuch as it is 
invariably touching/sharing the world as a distinct/specific thing (i.e., as co-
extensive). As Nancy defends, there is no who or what to touch; being is always 
already touching. Touch is not the action of an absolute subject towards an external 
world, it does not demand intention – it simply occurs.    
Derrida points to the fact that touching always touches the limit, since one 
only touches the outside of the thing. Even if one penetrates a thing, one does not 
touch but its surface. One is never really inside (On Touching, Jean Luc Nancy 103). 
Nancy clearly defends the idea that there is no inside to things. This is in line with 
his argument that there is no essence to things, that is, there is no hidden factor 
underneath the thing’s occurrence. Returning to the definition of being as taking 
place, it becomes clear that all existence is invariably external. The extensive 
“whatness” of existence demands this liminality of being. This is the “ex” (ex-
cription, ex-position...) that appears so often in Nancy. It is not a movement from 
inside to outside; it is the fact that being is always already taking place in the world 
and hence already touched in its extension. Put differently, the extension of being is 
a “surface of contact”. Being is always at its own threshold (Nancy, Ego Sum 115-
116).  
Things are never intact yet they are never in contact. In that sense, things are 
impenetrable (Nancy, The Birth to Presence 189), not because it is impossible to 
overcome their external layer and access their essential nature, but because there is 
no essential nature to be revealed. There is nothing to things beyond their taking 
place, so there is nothing “inside”.  
This seems reasonably obvious regarding thoughts, since thoughts do not have 
internal or external parts, and one could hardly argue that it is possible to cut a 
thought in half or be within a thought. In other words, a thought is always a 
singular impenetrable thing. We can be fully consumed or focused on a thought or 
feeling, but never penetrate it. It is always a contemplation from the “exterior”: one 
contemplates something “distinct” from oneself10. 
Still, Nancy’s sense-based ontology must account for “physical objects” in 
order to be relevant. Think, for example, of a ball made of a gel-like substance: I can 
obviously hold it in my hand and therefore touch its limits, but even if I introduce 
my finger inside the surface so that my finger is “inside” the ball, I have not 
                                                          
10 One is never identical to one’s thoughts. This is the configuration of subjectivity I will later explore. 
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penetrated the gel. I am still touching the gel from the outside. Now, my finger in 
completely engulfed by it, but since they are separate things, there is always a 
distinction between them. One could argue that I have penetrated the 
circumference, but this is also not true. I am not inside the ball. I am only touching 
it from another point. Nor has the circumference incorporated my finger. Its shape 
changes with my finger, but the ball remains the ball and my finger remains my 
finger. This is the most basic principle that two things cannot occupy the same space 
at the same time. At the moment that I introduce my finger, the space previously 
occupied by the ball is no longer occupied by it. In that way, it is impossible to enter 
the thing. You might put you hand inside it and still you would just encounter the 
limit of the thing.                 
One might argue that this argument is absurd, since everyone has entered a 
room or placed their hand inside a bag. The experience of accessing something is 
natural. Intuitively, one comprehends that all things have volume and depth, so it 
seems absurd to deny that things have an inner side. This is in fact a challenge for 
Nancy, but I believe his argument concerning black holes overcomes the challenge. 
Singularities (black holes) are only accessed from the outside. One is always on the 
exterior of a black hole since it has no inner since: there is only gravity. In that sense, 
one cannot enter a black hole. If one were to enter a black hole, one would only 
encounter more “black hole” (i.e., gravity). The same is valid for a room or a bag: 
even if one enters them, one only encounters “room” or “bag”, that is, one only finds 
the liminal extension of those things. One is never absolutely “in” the bag or the 
room, even though one is undeniably inside them.  
This point returns to Nancy’s comment regarding Wittgenstein’s phrase. 
Nancy argues that the world has no Other since it is all there is. So even the outside 
of the world must be inside. It is now clear that Nancy does not mean that the world 
folds itself as to have its exterior on the inside: he means that all things are 
invariably outside11. There is no inside of the world from which sense is excluded. All 
there is to the world is its taking place, and by taking place it touches, and in 
touching it is always outside. But not outside itself; in fact, it is at its utmost reality. 
It is at itself since it is occurring.       
In this sense, touching marks the ontological being-with since it marks the 
materiality (extension and weight) of existing. Being is taking place so, by existing, 
each thing is in a spatial/extensive configuration among other things. By the sheer 
fact of their existing, things are always on the limit of themselves. Even if there is no 
contact, all things are as close as possible to each other, hence they invariably touch 
each other. 
I believe the notion of contiguity (as proposed in Watkin 179) is relevant here. 
Contiguity means bordering something, approximate in space or even in contact; it 
makes reference to proximity with distinction/separation. I believe this is precisely 
Nancy’s description of sense. For him, being is tangential. Things are always in 
                                                          
11 Nancy is not arguing like a behaviorist that we only have access to the outside and there is an inner intact 
"black-box". In fact, the whole distinction between inner and outwards collapses since existence is only the fact 
that things take place (i.e., their extension and weight). Outside here does not oppose inside. It marks the fact 
that there is no inside since all things are exposed/taking place.   
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touch with each other, but there is no contact, so they never really touch. Things are 
touching and untouchable simultaneously. This is the meaning of Nancy's 
affirmation that things are tangible: “Sense is concrete: that is, it is tangible and 
impenetrable (these two attributes mutually imply each other)” (The Sense of the 
World 11).  
Touch is always limited to a non-extended point, which is true only in its 
occurrence. touch is not an intersection or accumulation of points. Things do not 
cross each other, they remain distinguished. Tangency happens only as a fact of its 
occurrence, but not as something in itself. This is the meaning of Nancy’s argument 
that “there is no ‘the’ touch”. Touch is not “the” sense of existence so it does not 
form a field of being. It does not take place, it simply punctuates the fact of things’ 
occurrence as being-with.          
Derrida differentiates himself from Nancy by pointing out that Nancy defends 
the formulation “there is no ‘the’ X”, while Derrida prefers the formulation “X if 
there is any” [s’il y en a] (On Touching, Jean Luc Nancy 288). Derrida comments 
that both come from a deconstructive move where multiplicity interferes with the 
attempt to reach a definite sense of things. Still, he argues they are not equivalent12.  
McQuillan (Toucher I 203) is right in suggesting that Derrida is not convinced 
by Nancy’s ontology. Derrida seems to doubt Nancy’s capacity to deconstruct 
logocentrism, that is, Nancy’s capacity to comment on what there is, despite arguing 
that “there is no ‘the’ X”. Logos here has a double meaning. Logos means, firstly, a 
structure of knowledge, and Derrida doubts if Nancy’s ontology is not 
grounded/dependent on an external grounding anchor (i.e., on an ultimate definition 
of sense); Derrida’s “s’il y en a” suggests that existence is always conditioned. And 
secondly, logos means truth, and Derrida is doubtful of Nancy’s ontology capacity to 
comment on the truth of being. Derrida’s “s’il y en a” suggests there is never really a 
thing, hence there is no truth of being13.  
I believe this disbelief is most evident in their conversation (Derrida, 
“Interview with Jean-Luc Nancy” 115), when Derrida explicitly mentions his 
interest in “a before”. For him, there seems to always be a before (not 
chronologically, but as a condition). Nancy, on the other hand, is concerned with 
“what comes after”, that is, with what are the implications of what is, regardless of 
how it came to be. Those are vital questions because a response to Derrida’s criticism 
is equivalent to showing Nancy’s success in his groundless ontology. My thesis as a 
whole is, to a certain extent, an attempt to unfold Nancy’s success (even if I am not 
directly responding to Derrida).    
An appropriate response to Derrida disbelief would be the notion of touch. 
Nancy argues that, despite the separation and impenetrability of things, there is 
touch. Put differently, despite the fact that touching is always an encounter with 
the untouchable, there is such a thing as touch. In fact, it is all there is since being is 
being-with. Things touch each other even though Nancy argues that they never 
really come in contact with each other. So, for Nancy, there is touch despite (or even 
                                                          
12 I will not comment on Derrida’s philosophy, but I believe the difference between the formulations enlightens a 
crucial point in Nancy’s theory. 
13 Berkman’s arguments are extremely helpful here (Berkman and Cohen-Levinas 446-447). 
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because) there is no “the” touch, that is, because there is no ultimate 
definition/contact. For Derrida, it seems there is never touch because there is no 
“the” touch. It is an aporia of contact which seems to be left unresolved. Derrida is 
still concerned with the condition of touch as the way to ground it – a concern with 
being’s condition (before) of possibility – only to find that it is impossible and 
conclude that there is no ground for existence. Nancy, on the other hand, defends 
that there is touch even if there is no ground for it. Things are, regardless of their 
“before”.     
McQuillan14 (Toucher I) argues that Nancy, in his argument that “there is no 
‘the’ X”, cancels the possibility of any concrete philosophical theory since it is a 
determination that there is no determination. He even affirms that Nancy invents 
an object (touch) only to annul its existence (205-207). I believe his reading misses 
Nancy’s point. Nancy’s formulation is not annulling existence, he exclusively 
negates the definite article “the”. He is arguing that a thing’s existence is not given 
to a definition. His formulation argues that there is something, but since there is no 
ultimate definition of it, it is nothing.  
Nancy is arguing that undoubtedly there are things, but there is nothing they 
ultimately are since there is no essence – hence, there is no “the” X. He shows it is 
impossible to fully touch the sense of X. One can only be-with it (touching it from 
the outside). In fact, there is nothing more to being ( to “thinghood”/“whatness”) 
than this sensing, i.e., the fact that existing is constantly taking place and therefore 
touching without ever contacting anything. Derrida’s formulation, on the other 
hand, seems to imply that despite its occurrence, something is never completely 
itself; it lacks something essential, so one wonders “if there is”. In Nancy, things 
undoubtedly are. So, there is touch even if there is no “the” touch, just as there are 
things even if there is no “the” thing. 
With being-with, Nancy’s objective is not to reveal the common ground behind 
all existing things. Sense is not the common principle of all existing things. Such a 
project would imply the notion of prima materia; a resort to some essence of being. 
Commenting on all things being-with each other, in this context, would be a research 
into the principle permeating all individual things, but Nancy opposes individuality. 
There are only specific beings/senses: unique and singular things in-common but 
without anything in common: “No doubt, the singular is per se: it singularizes itself 
only by or through it singularity” and  
 
What then is someone? This is precisely what one cannot ask- even 
though this is the whole question – because if there is someone, there 
has already been a response to the question (s/he has already 
responded). But there is someone, there are numerous someones, 
indeed, there is nothing else. [...] This is what “makes” up [fait] the 
world and “make sense” [fait sense]. Someone, some ones, the 
numerous ones, that is to say, the plural singular “is” the response 
that answers the question of the “sense of the world”. “Someone” 
ought to be approached from the angle of this response. But this 
                                                          
14 Adopting what he sees is Derrida’s position.  
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response responds to nothing. No one asked “is anyone there? It 
has not been possible to pose this question because something is 
there.” (Nancy, The Sense of the World 72 - 70)  
 
 
 
Singularity 
 
Things are not “created” from their relation with other things. They are 
invariably present in the world’s togetherness, but this does not exhaust the sense of 
being. “Whatness” is not reduced to being-with. It is not sufficient to argue that 
things must exist together in order to elucidate what they are; one must also account 
for how things are as singularities as specific beings. Each sense is one sense (a sense), 
it is a specific thing. Anything that exists is always already something/someone15, 
always already “one” but not in the sense of being “the one”; rather, in the sense of 
being “this/that one/thing” and not “another”. There is no extraordinary quality 
making it an absolutely incomparable thing. Singularity does not point at the 
individuality of a thing (“the one thing”). For Nancy, all things are just a thing 
(ordinary/common): each thing is like all others at the same time that it is this/that 
specific/singular thing. It is being in the most common and singular aspect of it16.  
For example, each day is one specific day. It is a momentaneous event that is 
specific in its occurrence. At the same time, days are part of a plural configuration of 
time organization. Days are not extraordinary events, yet each day is a 
singular/unique event.   
The question of singularity also implies the question of identity: what does it 
mean to be one thing? The singular being always implies the “more than one”, but 
Nancy still wants to preserve the “oneness” of each thing without turning it into an 
individual and fulfilled thing (Morin, Jean Luc Nancy 37). Things are not absolutely 
identical to themselves, yet, they are invariably themselves. This concerns the 
concepts of ipseity and aseity.  
There is no one thing holding all possible senses of the same thing. All possible 
senses are singular senses of a plural configuration. In fact, there is no absolute 
referential object, there are only senses: “3+1”, “2+2” and “4” are all equal to 4, but 
the question regarding the “whatness” of 4 remains open. Answering that 4 is “4” is 
tautological. But again, according to Nancy, one does not need to uphold more than 
that, as long as one comprehends that there is no essential nature of 4. All there is to 
4 is all its occurrences, i.e., all its senses or all the existing things that are “4”. 
It is possible to challenge the previous argument and state that numbers are 
just ideas, so they make a convenient case for proving there is no referential object 
                                                          
15  The argument here is the banal statement that to be is to be some-thing in the most general sense of the term. 
16 “There is relation as relation of example: every one, being born, dying, being-there, exemplifies singularity. 
Each proposes itself as an example, if you like, but it exposes this example, every time, as exemplary, in the 
sense of a remarkable model. That which is exemplary each time, that which sets an example, is singularity 
itself, insofar as it is never anything but this or that singularity, inimitable at the very heart of its being-
whatever.” (Nancy, The Sense of the World 73). 
Griot : Revista de Filosofia, Amargosa  - BA, v.19, n.1, p.76-95, fevereiro, 2019 ISSN 2178-1036 
 
LISTIK, Yonathan. Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of singularity. Griot : Revista de Filosofia, Amargosa – BA, v.19, 
n.1, p.76-95, fevereiro, 2019.   86 
 
relevant to them; validation would only come from showing that Nancy’s 
configuration is applicable to “actual” objects. Frege’s “actual” existing star does 
not depend on its senses. There is a star and one must be able to comment on this 
fact using Nancy’s ontology if his philosophy is to be relevant. I believe this is 
precisely Nancy’s point: there is a star and it is self-sufficient (i.e., this fact is all there 
is to the star), so the star’s existence is not conditioned on its senses although it is its 
senses. If one searches for the nature of the star, one will always encounter 
something, but never an ultimate sense the star essentially is.  
For example, one might affirm that the star is essentially composed of element 
“X”, but one has only transformed the original question without answering it, since 
one still has to comment on the nature of “X” in order to reach the star’s ipseity. It 
is possible to define it as just another element (for example X is Y), but the question 
will always remain. For every possible answer regarding the nature of X, one can 
always reach deeper into it and question its composition and nature. There will 
never be “the” Thing that explains all other things, since such object would have to 
exist beyond all things17. This does not mean that the answer is inaccessible or that 
there is no answer because the thing is essentially composed of nothing. The opposite 
is true: there is always a thing. One is constantly confronted by materiality despite 
not finding a prima materia. In fact, one never escapes such materiality. There is 
always already “access” to the truth of existing since one is always confronted by 
things taking place, so one is always confronted by what things are: existing. Or in a 
simple formulation, one is always confronted18 by the fact that things are existing. 
Singular sense is the fact that there is no “the” object, since there is nothing the 
object ultimately is, while at the same time, there is something necessarily.  
All there is to the star (or any object) is its occurrences: the physical elements 
taking place, as well as, the range of its conceptualization. The star is neither just 
the object separated from our thought nor the result of our thoughts about it. It is 
both. For Nancy, thoughts are as material as physical things. Things are the self-
coincidence of all the senses they are, that is, the star is the morning star, the 
evening star, Venus, carbon (or any other chemical we find there), protons, […] 
without any of those senses being its essential form of existence. That is, without 
ultimately being any of those senses. There is no privileged stance where the star 
takes place. All the “places” the star takes place in are equally relevant for Nancy. 
The thing is the co-extension of all its senses’ extension. 
There is no ultimate instance or essential occurrence where the star really takes 
place and based on it one could ground an ontological knowledge of the object. All 
there is, are things existing as sense: being towards/at [etre-a] the world. That is, 
being as the activity of being, as the act of taking place, as the sense (orientation) 
in/at the world19. In this way, one can comment on the star because there invariably 
is a star, but it is nothing because there is no one definite thing the star is. Thus, 
                                                          
17 I already made this point earlier on the first part. 
18 This confrontation is related to being-with since there is nothing outside the togetherness of the world. One is 
always in-touch/confronted with the world. Existence is thrown/abandoned against the world.   
19 “Ecceity opens an areality. But the areality of the area (of being) is not its design, not its configuration. It is its 
tracing, beginning from the here. The here has no place: at every moment it is here and there, here and now, for 
here is now. Hic est nunc.” (Nancy, The Birth to Presence 47) 
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ipseity is aseity because the thing does not rely on anything else (Nancy, The Sense 
of the World 155-157).  
Even though things are nothing, they invariably are; moreover, their existence 
is not conditioned, so it is self-sufficient. The "whatness" of things already implies 
their non-conditioned presence. They simply are at the same time that they are not 
an absolute individual thing. In other words, things are self-sufficient, but not self-
grounding. Returning to Harman’s criticism, Nancy is not searching for the object 
that remains regardless of all its relations (since there is none), but for the object 
that “includes/considers” all its senses without ever becoming an absolute thing (an 
ultimately grounded existence/sense). Existing is simultaneously always present 
(being-there) and without any definite grounds for presence, since there is no reason 
for its taking place. Being(s) is singular plural because there is never “one” sense. 
Sense is always senses. Always “more than one” even in its singularity.             
The thinking/perceiving entity (cogito) also exists as a singular sense since it 
refers to the oneness in being oneself. Selfhood, for Nancy, concerns the factual 
occurrence of the singular “subject” (i.e., that the self is oneself20). This “subject” 
(this quality of being an I) is not the unity of an enclosed entity21 acting in the 
world. Namely, “subject” is not an agent. Nancy defines selfhood (Nancy and 
Hanson 10) as a gap of space-time within the self. That is, selfhood means the “more 
than one” that every one invariably is (Nancy, The Sense of the World 71). It is 
always already outside itself (different from itself) without ever being beyond itself 
(more than itself). Some one is always one/singular despite barely being something 
[sans pourtant].  
This argument is evident in Nancy’s reflection on the title of the collection 
“Who comes after the subject?” (Nancy, “Un Sujet” 90; see also Cadava et al. 7)22. 
The sole fact that he is not interested in the conditions/causes of the subject but its 
consequences already shows Nancy is not concerned with foundation: Nancy attests 
existence, rather than found it on a sub-ject properly (as in a grounded position). It 
is the constant being, i.e., the constant ejection/abandonment23 of the self among all 
things:  
 
Presence takes place, that is to say it comes into presence. It 
is that which comes indefinitely to itself, never stops 
coming, arriving: the “subject” that is never the subject of 
itself. The “ipseity” of presence lies in the fact that it 
engenders itself into presence: presence to itself, in a sense, 
but where this “self” itself is only the to (the taking place, 
placing) of presence (Cadava et al.7).  
                                                          
20 “The subject contains its difference from itself. The subject not only has this difference, it is this difference. If 
the subject did not differ from itself, it would not be what it is: a subject relating itself to itself. A=A signifies 
that A in itself is its difference from itself, and that it derives its equality, its being-equal to itself, only from this 
difference.” (Nancy, The Birth to Presence 11) 
21 A monad, for example.  
22 His reflection is best understood considering Nancy’s comments that he is concerned with the place the subject 
occupies, i.e., with its taking place in the sense previously mentioned (Cadava et al. 98).  
23 See ”Abandoned Being” in  The Birth to Presence, especially 46-47. 
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It is not a question of the subject who knows itself by grounding its truth; 
rather, it is the question of the subject who is itself merely by exiting24: “Being is the 
actuality of existence” (Cadava et al. 6). 
Nancy (The Birth to Presence 30) compares oneness to a spasmatic convulsion 
in the sense that it is not a given object or a state, but it is always “contorting” 
itself. Being is not moving from one point to another (it has no telos or cause), 
being/existing [être à] is moving/acting without “going” anywhere. Hence, it 
“trembles”. Nancy often quotes the Hegelian formulation that the subject is “that 
which can retain in itself its own contradiction” (Derrida, “Interview with Jean-Luc 
Nancy” 116; Nancy, Le Poid d’une Pensee 24; and Cadava et al. 6). James (The 
Fragmentary Demand 102), when commenting on Nancy’s conception of subjecthood, 
calls Nancy’s subject a centrifugal movement of being in order to differentiate it 
from Heidegger's centripetal being. In my view, James’ terminology is imprecise.  
As James argues, Nancy’s conception of being25 does not present the thing as 
“gathered” into being by a force26, but unlike his alternative description, Nancy does 
not think there is a center of being from where the movement of being occurs. 
Oneness is not being dispersed due to its “essential contradiction”. The singular 
thing is not “spinning” and taking place due to the dynamic of impossibility 
intrinsic to its “oneness”. Being is without an original position or 
conflictual/dialectical dynamic. The “heart of things” is not one point; rather, it is 
one that is “more than one”. Existing does not result from the interaction of two 
contradictory aspects; it is the mere co-extension (coincidence) of contradictory 
existing senses (Nancy, Being Singular Plural 33).      
So, sense’s/being’s singularity does not concern absolute identity. For Nancy, 
identity/ipseity, i.e., being a specific something, concerns self-coincidence: “It is the 
very incidence, or the accident, or the occasion of the coincidence: […] The existence 
of the thing co-incides insofar as, in the incidences, it spaces, opens a continuum 
(which does not exist) through the discrete quantity of a there, which is its very 
quality as thing.” (The Birth to Presence 187). The thing’s oneness regards the fact 
that all its senses take place (incido, in Latin, which is also the root for 
incident/event) with themselves. This is the meaning of being singular-plural. It 
means the occurrence of something is the happening of all it senses. Sense is about 
being-with/touching itself (Nancy, Ego Sum 83). 
Something is all its senses “self-touching you” [se toucher toi] each other. Put 
differently, something is the fact that all its occurrences/senses take place (co-incide) 
and therefore are simultaneously the same – hence “self-touching” – and different 
(but in the most intimate sense) – hence “you”. “Se toucher toi” marks the fact that 
sense is both the most intimate and exterior side of the thing: it exposes sense as the 
outside of the thing, as sense is never the essential aspect of anything. Self-touching 
is always from an exterior position (Nancy, Ego Sum 115-116). As existing is always 
                                                          
24 See Nancy’s comments on excogite (Ego Sum 30 and 77). 
25 Both physical and thinking entities (i.e., both the star and selfhood). 
26 As if to existence results from a casual force. See my argument on page 6. 
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taking place, the most intimate place of being is its exterior, since it the only place 
there is.  
This is further emphasized by Nancy’s word choice. He uses the second person 
singular tu [you] rather than he/she/it. Tu in French is an intimate convention of 
address. One should normally use the polite address vous to address another person 
until there is enough intimacy between the two so that tu can replace vous.  
There is even a verb for this: tutoyer (which means to address in the familiar 
convention tu). With the concept of “se toucher toi”, Nancy is explicitly 
emphasizing the fact that self-identity is at the same time touching (and hence 
exterior) and the most adjacent stance possible through its self-coincidence. With 
that, he upholds that we can only se-tutoyer, i.e., touch/approach existence from the 
most intimate exteriority. 
 
Difference 
 
Following this line, in order to properly comment on a sense, I must elucidate 
how things are distinct from each other. Within the togetherness of the world, each 
thing is discrete and hence distinct in relation to all other things. Considering that 
objects are not individual realizations of any principle, one has to account for the 
way each object is a specific object despite being common (ordinary). In other 
words, if things are singular-plural, one must make explicit the way things are 
specific without resorting to a defining essence (without arguing that each one of 
them has a “special” essence).  
The notion of differentiation is crucial, because the singular is not a singular 
example/specimen of a larger configuration. The singular does not mean “to be one 
object in a series of identical/indistinguishable objects”, as in the repetition of the 
same object infinitely. There is no common measure or ground that allows such 
comparison. Each thing has a different “whatness” without having any essential 
principle that differentiates it. Things are just distinct without there being any 
grounds for comparing them. 
 Nancy uses the notion of differance to illustrate this point. According to him, 
differance is not an operation on existence, but the “act of being” itself. Things are 
differance. To exist is to differ from itself: “Being senses itself deferring and 
differing”27 (The Sense of the World 3528); and  
 
[...] meaning is itself the sharing of Being. Meaning begins where 
presence is not pure presence but where presence comes apart [se 
disjoint] in order to be itself as such. This “as” presupposes the 
distancing, spacing, and division of presence. Only the concept of 
“presence” contains the necessity of this division. Pure unshared 
presence—presence to nothing, of nothing, for nothing — is neither 
present nor absent. It is the simple implosion of a being that could 
                                                          
27 In the original: “L’etre se sent differant” (56). 
28 See also The Sense of the World 14. 
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never have been — an implosion without any trace. (Being Singular 
Plural 2) 
 
For example, one might not be aware that the evening star and the morning 
star both refer to the “same” star despite knowing both of them29. Or a more trivial 
example, every superhero has a secret identity so every person knows both the 
superhero and its alter-ego, but the secret identity depends on the fact that people 
distinguish between them. These things are all different things despite being the 
“same” thing. They are one that is always “more than one”. It is just a self-
conscience of distinguished senses as described earlier.  
Considering Nancy’s previous argument that existing is the act of being, this 
action now gains a new dimension. There is no pure undifferentiated being to which 
differance is “applied” in order to “shape” it into singularity. It does not develop in 
relation to other things: it exists among other things but it does “interact”30 with 
them. Nancy’s argument is that existing is being-differance. Each thing is always 
already one thing, not because it is not another (as if it acted in order to achieve such 
result), but due to the fact that being is always already this/that singular specific 
thing. This fact already implicates that it is not another. It is, therefore, always 
already distinguished from all other things by simply taking place.  
There is no reason for all things to be discrete, things just necessarily are. This 
is the basic physical principle that two things cannot occur at the same place at the 
same time. Each single thing necessarily takes place (since to exist is to exist 
somewhere) and two things cannot occupy the same space at the same time, hence 
all existing things are necessarily distinct. 
In fact, the relation of equality between two things is absurd. Things are 
themselves and therefore singular31 (one specific thing) or they are in a relation of 
equality and therefore two separate things already. A thing is never completely 
equal neither to itself nor to something else. In order to argue that two discrete 
things are equal, one would have to defend the configuration where despite being 
different, they share the same essence. Equality already assumes difference and yet 
it argues that despite the difference, things are essentially the same (their 
manifestation differs but their “nature” is the same). In order to defend equality, 
one must ground it on a common essence between two things that are differentiated 
in reality. Since there is not grounding essence, equality between two things makes 
no sense. 
                                                          
29 One might argue that such person does not really know the stars if he/she is unaware that they both refer to 
the same star. Again, in this scenario, one never really knows the star because this counter-arguments assumes 
there is something essential about it beyond its sense (its taking place). But as argued before, there is never an 
absolute definition of something. One could argue that the star is not really a star but the planet Venus, but one 
has just pointed at another sense (another occurrence of the star). One would still need to define what is essential 
about Venus that only once you know it, you would gain authority on the subject and therefore the “confusion” 
in distinguishing them I described becomes impossible. Since such absolute definition is impossible, my case 
holds.      
30 As mentioned before, there is no absolute contact between things. Touching is always on the limit, since things 
are impenetrable. Hence there cannot be an interaction.   
31 That is, equal to itself by self-coincidence of self-contradictory senses. Since things are always “more than 
one”, they are always already discrete from themselves.  
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Being-differance means the act of existing is the constant ab-sensing of essence. 
Ab-sensing from essence does not mean that essence is negated in order to become 
specific. Ab-sensing from essence means that existence (i.e. the act of existing) 
happens without any essence. In this way, things do not become differentiated. There 
is no process of becoming discrete from other things, the thing is not the result of the 
dialectical interaction with the world – it is just the act of being that necessarily 
occurs and, by existing, it is necessarily different from every other thing, since there 
is no essence that could serve as a common ground for comparison. It is not a 
foundation of the singular existing being; rather, it is an attestation (a response in 
the sense posed earlier). In existence (i.e. in the act of existing), each singular being 
is already differentiated forming numerous one(s) that exist-with without any 
interaction between them. That is the meaning of differentiation. 
On this subject, Critchley accuses Nancy of undermining otherness, since, as he 
sees it, Nancy argues that things are only particular examples of a universal rule. 
Nancy’s differentiation argument would not be sufficiently “radical” and, at the 
end, his is a total ontological theory. He argues that Nancy’s being-with is a total 
intersubjectivity, in the sense that being-with becomes the grounding law of 
existence. In that sense, there is no absolute other since the subject engulfs it. 
I believe Nancy overcomes the distinction between same and other. There is no 
radical alterity in Nancy. All things are invariably other to themselves. One is 
always “more than one” as mentioned before. It is always already with itself. It is a 
“self touching you”, so it invariably includes its otherness/exteriority. In that sense, 
all things are different/other, but there is no radical inconceivable difference. 
Alterity is the difference of being itself32. They are just touching the contradiction 
that they themselves are. To touch the other has the same ontological status as 
touching oneself. The two instances of touch are not the same thing since they are 
two different senses, but they are both senses. 
The logic of the absolute other (the transcendental principle/the point beyond 
the togetherness) might mislead one into thinking Nancy presents an image where 
otherness is incorporated into the totality of the world. It is true that, for him, 
otherness is part of totality, but it is only so inasmuch as plurality/otherness is all 
there is to such totality. Since there is no essence or principle determining existence, 
there is only surprise. Put differently, there are only encounters with the other. To 
some extent, Nancy’s otherness is extremely radical, since there is no “safe ground” 
from where the subject can encounter its “absolute other” and be surprised (as 
Critchley demands in 66). The subject is “strange” to itself and to the world. In 
Nancy, otherness is engulfed into totality because it is all there is33.       
 
                                                          
32 Watkin uses a reference Nancy makes in Being Singular Plural 67 to Ricoeur's “Soi-meme comme un autre”, in 
order to argue that Nancy takes this question from him. I do not wish to discuss the relation or explore Ricoeur's 
arguments, but I believe the reference to be very illuminating: “one appears to oneself insofar as one is already 
an other for oneself”. 
33 As mentioned before, “all there is” is surprising. 
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Conclusion 
 
The relation between the elements of sense/being singular-plural do not form a 
whole since each element is both singular and differentiated. This means that each 
element of sense is just a sense of sense. They are not three parts to the “puzzle” of 
sense or the same sense through different angles; rather, they are three senses that 
exist together touching each other yet separate from each other. Thus, they 
invariably exist-with each other and their togetherness is all there is to sense, at the 
same time that they do not form a “complete” picture of sense. They are singular 
objects, distinct from each other and with each other. 
As Nancy states (“Of Being-in-Common” 7), being-with is a relation without 
relation. It is the simple fact that things go together without any reason or factor 
joining them. He even gives the example of passengers on a train who are not a 
collective at the same time that they are undeniably together. There is nothing 
joining them since they are merely on the same train. There is no reason for their 
reunion, and one can even claim that they are barely united. It is, in fact, the 
absence of any link that makes the relation possible. It preserves the distinction 
within the plurality. This is the meaning of being-singular plural.     
It is impossible to give a definitive categorization of singularity, as there is no 
ultimate individualizing quality one can ground uniqueness on. At the same time, 
every-single-thing is always already a thing. One can argue that, for Nancy, the 
singularity of being means being/existing just as the liminality of its existence 
(being-with)34. It is at the same a singular entity, but never an 
individual/independent being, since its existence (its act of being) demands touching. 
Being is just the “contact surface” of the untouchable touch. In simple words, there 
is no “the” thing, but undoubtedly there are things. Singularity/Oneness is the fact 
that contradictory senses self-coincide, that is, the singular thing is the plurality of 
senses that coincide in the same thing without ever being equal to themselves35. This 
is the configuration of being singular-plural.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 That is, being just as the exposition/presentation of the thing. See the chapter “Expeausition (Skin-Show)” 
(Corpus 32-37). 
35 In this way, the world is one without being an absolute unity. It is simply the self-coincidence of all 
senses/things in their self-contradiction/difference. All things are the world but none of them are ”the” world. 
There is no “one” thing the world is because there is no “the” world.  
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